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This dashboard should work on mobile, but is intended for use with a computer.2023 Israel-Hamas War (מלחמת חרבות ברזל) - some data and charts
We are currently on the 370 day since the war started, on early morning October 7th, 2023.
Overview: The 2023 Israel-Hamas War marks a significant conflict in the Middle East, with far-reaching impacts.
This conflict is far different than past escalations in Gaza or Israel-Palestine authorities conflicts, and leads to various military and civilian actions and reactions.
This analysis only touches some quantitative aspects, and tracks data changes over time.
For contextual understanding and background, you may refer to https://oct7map.com/ that provides a map visualisation with insights into the events of the October 7th Massacre.
In addition read this CSIS analysis where you can get a sense of how serious is the event.
There are many sources that adds info not fully expressed in this dashboard. For example the INSS that you can click below to see.
This conflict is far different than past escalations in Gaza or Israel-Palestine authorities conflicts, and leads to various military and civilian actions and reactions.
This analysis only touches some quantitative aspects, and tracks data changes over time.
For contextual understanding and background, you may refer to https://oct7map.com/ that provides a map visualisation with insights into the events of the October 7th Massacre.
In addition read this CSIS analysis where you can get a sense of how serious is the event.
There are many sources that adds info not fully expressed in this dashboard. For example the INSS that you can click below to see.
Abducted (חטופים)
We start with the Israelis abducted on October 7th. In addition, it doesn't account for the four Israelis already held in Gaza prior to the war.
It indicates 97 (101 when including the additional 4) individuals currently detained by Hamas, with 64 are alive, or at least not reported otherwise. In addition to 4 Israelis held by Hamas from before Oct 7, 2023.
(It should be noted we don't know how many are alive, and that there are reports that many of the abducted people are dead)
The group includes a nine-month-old baby and elderly individuals who were abruptly awoken by the attack, witnessed the brutal murder of family and friends, and were subsequently taken to Gaza.
None have received visits from the Red Cross, nor are they being afforded the basic human rights typically extended to prisoners of war, a status that does not apply to them.
Presently, the military operation seems ineffective in securing the release of our kidnapped citizens, and it does not demonstrate any clear progress in strengthening our position for negotiations.
Consequently, what is arguably the first goal of the war remains unachieved at this time.
It indicates 97 (101 when including the additional 4) individuals currently detained by Hamas, with 64 are alive, or at least not reported otherwise. In addition to 4 Israelis held by Hamas from before Oct 7, 2023.
(It should be noted we don't know how many are alive, and that there are reports that many of the abducted people are dead)
The group includes a nine-month-old baby and elderly individuals who were abruptly awoken by the attack, witnessed the brutal murder of family and friends, and were subsequently taken to Gaza.
None have received visits from the Red Cross, nor are they being afforded the basic human rights typically extended to prisoners of war, a status that does not apply to them.
Presently, the military operation seems ineffective in securing the release of our kidnapped citizens, and it does not demonstrate any clear progress in strengthening our position for negotiations.
Consequently, what is arguably the first goal of the war remains unachieved at this time.
Casulties נרצחים וחללים
Israeli Internally Displaced People (מפונים ומתפנים)
People living near the border are not safe.
There are many Israelis who are internally displaced in the country
Roughly estimated at 154,000 people, out of which 109,000 are formaly evacuated to other cities.
There are many Israelis who are internally displaced in the country
Roughly estimated at 154,000 people, out of which 109,000 are formaly evacuated to other cities.
You can hover on the map to see the name and the population of each town.
Data on formally evacuated towns is from מרכז המחקר והמידע של הכנסת - שירותי חינוך לתלמידים מפונים מביתם במלחמת חרבות ברזל.
Assumption is that towns that are formally evacuated have only 10% of the population that stayed in them, and informal evacuation from towns with more than 20,000 people are evacuated by only 15% of the population, and towns with less than 20,000 people are evacuated by 50% of the population.
The current estimates for towns with informal evacuation are approximate. Your feedback would be valuable; please send it to hovav@hotmail.com
Numbers were calculated under the assumption that formally evacuated towns retain about 10% of their original population.
Additionally, in towns with a population exceeding 20,000, it is estimated that 15% of the population participates in informal evacuation, whereas in towns with fewer than 20,000 residents, this figure rises to 50%.
Some people can't go back home because it is ruined. That goes both in the South (Hamas) but also in the North (Hezbollah).
Many are displaced because their towns are being heavily bombed, and it is not safe to be in the area.
As Nasrallah rightly claimed of Israel is having a security zone in the north for the first time after the security zone was used to be built in South Lebanon
Furthermore, residents living near the border are gripped by fear of another unforeseen massacre, akin to the tragic events of October 7th, leading many to hesitate in returning to their homes.
While Hamas and Hezbollah have been responsible for the majority of attacks, the Israeli government has yet to provide a clear plan for the rehabilitation of these towns.
The government not only failed to provide a clear plan for the rehabilitation of these towns, but also failed to compensate and treat its displaced citizens.
Even showing empathy to these victums is scarce by the Israeli government.
Data on formally evacuated towns is from מרכז המחקר והמידע של הכנסת - שירותי חינוך לתלמידים מפונים מביתם במלחמת חרבות ברזל.
Assumption is that towns that are formally evacuated have only 10% of the population that stayed in them, and informal evacuation from towns with more than 20,000 people are evacuated by only 15% of the population, and towns with less than 20,000 people are evacuated by 50% of the population.
The current estimates for towns with informal evacuation are approximate. Your feedback would be valuable; please send it to hovav@hotmail.com
Numbers were calculated under the assumption that formally evacuated towns retain about 10% of their original population.
Additionally, in towns with a population exceeding 20,000, it is estimated that 15% of the population participates in informal evacuation, whereas in towns with fewer than 20,000 residents, this figure rises to 50%.
Some people can't go back home because it is ruined. That goes both in the South (Hamas) but also in the North (Hezbollah).
Many are displaced because their towns are being heavily bombed, and it is not safe to be in the area.
As Nasrallah rightly claimed of Israel is having a security zone in the north for the first time after the security zone was used to be built in South Lebanon
Furthermore, residents living near the border are gripped by fear of another unforeseen massacre, akin to the tragic events of October 7th, leading many to hesitate in returning to their homes.
While Hamas and Hezbollah have been responsible for the majority of attacks, the Israeli government has yet to provide a clear plan for the rehabilitation of these towns.
The government not only failed to provide a clear plan for the rehabilitation of these towns, but also failed to compensate and treat its displaced citizens.
Even showing empathy to these victums is scarce by the Israeli government.
Alarm Frequency Analysis: Understanding the Scope of Attacks in Israel
The forthcoming graph details the frequency of alarms, indicative of attacks, across various regions in Israel.
It's important to note that this representation is not exhaustive; attacks on Israel manifest in numerous forms.
You can also see here how many days have passed (per range from Gaza) without any attack - to see how it changes over the war (or to estimate how likely is another attack, today)
The data captures only a fraction of the broader narrative of insecurity in Israel.
This includes over 150,000 internally displaced individuals and nearly 70 towns evacuated along the Gaza and Lebanon borders, which have sustained considerable damage.
Many of these towns remain uninhabitable, a situation that would persist even if hostilities ceased immediately.
The inhabitants of these towns face profound uncertainty about their safety and the feasibility of returning home.
There is a prevailing fear that, even in the event of a ceasefire, returning residents may be exposed to another surprise massacure.
Furthermore, almost a year into the war, there are frequent attacks on towns near both the Gaza border and Lebanon border. The Israeli government has yet to provide a clear plan for the rehabilitation of these towns, and is asking people near Gaza (eg Sderot) to return to a place that is still frequently bombed with rockets.
Some northern towns are destroyed in a way that makes it unrealistic to return to even after the war.
It's important to note that this representation is not exhaustive; attacks on Israel manifest in numerous forms.
You can also see here how many days have passed (per range from Gaza) without any attack - to see how it changes over the war (or to estimate how likely is another attack, today)
The data captures only a fraction of the broader narrative of insecurity in Israel.
This includes over 150,000 internally displaced individuals and nearly 70 towns evacuated along the Gaza and Lebanon borders, which have sustained considerable damage.
Many of these towns remain uninhabitable, a situation that would persist even if hostilities ceased immediately.
The inhabitants of these towns face profound uncertainty about their safety and the feasibility of returning home.
There is a prevailing fear that, even in the event of a ceasefire, returning residents may be exposed to another surprise massacure.
Furthermore, almost a year into the war, there are frequent attacks on towns near both the Gaza border and Lebanon border. The Israeli government has yet to provide a clear plan for the rehabilitation of these towns, and is asking people near Gaza (eg Sderot) to return to a place that is still frequently bombed with rockets.
Some northern towns are destroyed in a way that makes it unrealistic to return to even after the war.
to
As of early January, there has been a noticeable decrease in Hamas-initiated attacks, currently averaging about once a week in most regions.
However, areas within 7 km of Gaza continue to experience almost daily attacks.
Having Hamas being able and willing to launch rockets after so many months of war is an Israeli failure.
Considering the fact that the citizens of towns like Sderot were pushed to go back to their homes, and are still being bombed, is an amazing failure of the Israeli government.
In the north, Hezbollah's attacks are occurring daily, and there is a discernible escalation in the intensity of these confrontations on both sides.
However, areas within 7 km of Gaza continue to experience almost daily attacks.
Having Hamas being able and willing to launch rockets after so many months of war is an Israeli failure.
Considering the fact that the citizens of towns like Sderot were pushed to go back to their homes, and are still being bombed, is an amazing failure of the Israeli government.
In the north, Hezbollah's attacks are occurring daily, and there is a discernible escalation in the intensity of these confrontations on both sides.
Northern Israel Alarms by Hour
As of this writing the citizens in the north, at least those that are still there, are suffering from multiple attacks each day
The following chart shows how these alarms are distributed in the day
The following chart shows how these alarms are distributed in the day
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Anti-tank missiles from Lebanon map
Despite their name, anti-tank missiles in this conflict are frequently employed against buildings and civilians.
The map depicts the firing locations of these missiles from Lebanon. It's created by filtering out "anti-tank" references from ACLED data notes and refining the information.
Click on a town to view ACLED's detailed notes on each documented incident.
The map depicts the firing locations of these missiles from Lebanon. It's created by filtering out "anti-tank" references from ACLED data notes and refining the information.
Click on a town to view ACLED's detailed notes on each documented incident.
to
You may also be interested in seeing other types of attacks from Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, and back.
Ground operation map
At the biginning of the war a map showing where did the ground forces arrived was enlightning, but now it is less relevant.
Consider clicking below to hide it, and concentrate on the number of battles and air strikes in each Gaza region, instead.
Consider clicking below to hide it, and concentrate on the number of battles and air strikes in each Gaza region, instead.
This map delineates the areas in Gaza currently under Hamas control and highlights the zones where Israeli ground operations are actively ongoing.
You can open it on using this link.
Or inline but using this switch:
You can open it on using this link.
Or inline but using this switch:
Here are some snapshots of the ground operation map in different dates.
You can find these maps and zoom in on each of them, through the link above.
all are made by war mapper (twitter.com/War_Mapper)
You can find these maps and zoom in on each of them, through the link above.
all are made by war mapper (twitter.com/War_Mapper)
Note that the difference between Dec 31th and Jan 11th may be misleading, as main combat operations in the north of the Gaza Strip have come to an end, with the focus shifting to central and southern Gaza.
Just checking out where the IDF's been doesn't give you the full picture, not by a long shot.
So, you might wanna peek at this map over here that's supposed to show where each force is hanging out.
These maps? Yeah, they only scratch the surface. To dig deeper, we can dive into some analysis I pulled from ACLED data. It claims to cover the nitty-gritty on battles, air strikes, and the toll they've taken in Gaza.
Moreover, if you go to the other fronts section, and choose attacks on Gaza, you can click either the map or the plot to see the list of ACLED ntoes on these events.
Since the end of December 2023, there has been a significant decrease in both the number of battles and air strikes in North Gaza and Gaza City.
However, this trend is not observed in southern Gaza.
Additionally, since the *beginning* of December (just after the ceasefire), there has been a notable decline in the number of air strikes and related fatalities (with the majority of the fatalities resulting from air strikes).
Fast forward another 4 months and we see that the number of battles has decreased significantly, but the number of air strikes has remained relatively stable.
According to Politico on May 21 only 30 to 35 percent of Hamas fighters — those who were a part of Hamas before the Oct. 7 attack — have been killed and about 65 percent of its tunnels are still intact, U.S. intelligence indicates.
More than five months earlier, it seemed bad but slightly more optimistic: According to Doron Kadosh The IDF announced Jan. 6th on the disbandment of all 12 Hamas battalions in the northern Gaza Strip - half of Hamas' military strength in Gaza.
From his description it seems that in the north it is estimated that 60% of the Hamas military strength was destroyed, and all in total 40%.
This probably means that the IDF is not planning to destroy all of Hamas' military strength, but only to weaken it significantly, or that we are expecting a very long war.
Furthermore, a Wall Street Jornal report from Jan. 21th, 2024, states that Israeli forces have killed 20% to 30% of Hamas’s fighters, U.S. intelligence agencies estimate, a toll that falls short so far of Israel’s goal of destroying the group and shows its resilience after months of war that have laid swaths of the Gaza Strip to ruin.
If that's anywhere near the truth, it means that the IDF is still far from effectively destroying all of Hamas' military strength.
Quating from the report: "Biden administration officials have begun to scale down their expectations for the war, to Hamas’s degradation as a security threat from its utter destruction.
And the U.S. has urged Israel to shift the war toward more targeted operations aimed at Hamas’s leadership.
Though Hamas has suffered thousands of casualties, according to U.S. and Israeli assessments, it aims simply to survive this conflict, current and former Israeli military officials said.
“You don’t have to win, you just have to not lose,” a senior Israeli military official said of Hamas’s goal. "
More than 7 months after the war started, while hurting Hamas tremendously, Israel failed to destroy Hamas' military strength, or Hamas' leadership.
Moreover, the Israeli government has failed to create an alternative to the Hamas regime in Gaza, which leads Hamas to be the main option, and hence survive politically.
The Hamas military personal can be replaced. So if there is no alternative to Hamas - Hamas will not be destroyed. The alternative needs support from the international community, and the Israeli government is not doing enough to create it. Putting it very gently.
Note you can also look at anti-tank missiles from Lebanon (against buildings and people), in the previous sections.
Exploring public opinion on the war in different countries can be quite challenging, but Google Trends offers an insightful approach.
By examining the search trends over time for "Stand with Israel" versus "From the River to the Sea" in various countries, we can begin to understand the prevailing sentiments towards the conflict.
It looks like the data is telling us a couple of things:
1. People's interest in the war is on the decline.
2. The Palestinian narrative seems to be gaining more traction than the Israeli one, even in countries that initially showed strong support for Israel.
Over time, it appears that the public opinion is increasingly leaning towards the Palestinian side of the story.
More on public opinion can be viewed through demonstrations around the world.
The following chart shows the number of demonstrations in different countries, with sentiment that is either Pro-Israel or Pro-Palestine.
This chart also tells us that people's interest in the war is on the decline, and that the Palestinian narrative is the dominant one.
In fact, the number of pro-Israel demonstrations has declined to practically zero, while the number of pro-Palestinian demonstrations has remained considerably high.
Our current situation in Israel consist of many government failures. Here is a partial list
1. Hostages: The government failed to rescue many hostages.
Many even argue that the government does not truly prioritize the rescue of hostages, and that their return will not happen unless the government will change.
2. Internally displaced citizens: There are about 150,000 Israelis displaced from their homes, both in the South and the North.
The government has failed to provide them with proper housing, and many are still living in hotels. The Lebanon border towns are deserted with citizens seeing no light.
The population who lived near the Gaza border is pressured to settle for conditions that are far from safetly that they deserve, and lack the quality of life and caring that we should all give them.
3. Prolonged, and failed, war:
One of Israels' consept of achieving security is short wars. Oct 7th war is not short, and with time it seems doubtful it is successful in bringing the Israel citizens the needed security.
Most of the IDF forces are no longer in Gaza, and in many ways the war is over (the fighting is not). But the war is not over for the citizens.
The government failed to provide a clear plan for the future, and the citizens are left in the dark.
This is true near Gaza, but also in the North, and in the West Bank, and Houthis attacks, and Iraq and Iran.
Many reserves soldiers are still prevented return to their lives, and are treated as government property.
4. Judicial "reform":
There is no president for the Supreme Court, delays in appointing judges in lower courts.
The courts are under a campaign of incitement, and at the same time - they appear scared and fearful, and in my view, fail in their role to protect against the misuse of power by the executive and legislative authorities.
The "reform" has reduced its profile, but the coalition parties are still working on it and pass legistlation.
5. Police:
There is no trust in the police (many cases in which policeman act as a militia that serves and is subordinate to the government, not to the law and the citizen).
6. The military is under a campaign of incitement.
7. There is division and rift among the people (is it even one people?).
8. The economy is in crisis, and at risk of a much greater crisis.
9. Media:
Media bodies that serve only the government, prominent representatives to the government (posing as journalists) in all major media outlets.
All this, alongside attacks on free media, rhetorically, economically through control mechanisms, and also through regulation.
10. International view:
Israel, amazing especially after the barbaric attack, is at a low in international support.
Israeli-U.S. relations are in crisis.
Anti-semithism has risen its head in many countries, including in the U.S. and in the U.K.
11. The state budget is sectorial, there is neither equality in burden nor in rights.
12. There is an avoidance of elections: Those that knew to demand resignation over much (much!) smaller disasters and failures, are holding to their seats, hoping the public rage will prove its bad long term memory.
13. There is evasion from establishing an investigative committee.
14. Populism, fascism (religious nationalist extremism), and religious extremism. Not a government but a regime.
15. There is a concern that the government will lead to a widespread war in the north or another sector to avoid elections and accountability.
Israel has known almost only better times, the general narrative is negative, but I have a lot of hope still.
True, not only have we been brutally attacked, but about a year later, too much still seems to go wrong - innocent people who were kidnapped from their beds are still hostages.
The war is not ending. Large parts of Israel are evacuated, and the few people who stayed are attacked daily.
International public opinion after all of this seems to be generally negative.
Israel's economy is on a decline. And, not to take lightly as this is a major issue, Israelis are internally divided.
I do believe that if we dare to be united on values (very different than just saying 'united' or 'together' while acting the other way, or while enforcing values that are not really shared by most Israelis), we can grow stronger from this.
These values are קדושת החיים (sanctity of life) and not hatred or land occupation.
These values are education, creativity, and the honest search for a harmonious life among different people, without enforcing one's beliefs as if everyone should be either the same or pushed aside.
These values should oppose terrorism and label it as such, exposing it wherever people try to portray it as something legitimate.
Just as we were educated and bred — we should strive to be a positive example, and not a mirror to many who are doing wrongs, just in the opposite direction.
None of it is simple. But it will succeed. Simply because the need for this success is stronger than any despair.
So, you might wanna peek at this map over here that's supposed to show where each force is hanging out.
These maps? Yeah, they only scratch the surface. To dig deeper, we can dive into some analysis I pulled from ACLED data. It claims to cover the nitty-gritty on battles, air strikes, and the toll they've taken in Gaza.
Moreover, if you go to the other fronts section, and choose attacks on Gaza, you can click either the map or the plot to see the list of ACLED ntoes on these events.
to
Since the end of December 2023, there has been a significant decrease in both the number of battles and air strikes in North Gaza and Gaza City.
However, this trend is not observed in southern Gaza.
Additionally, since the *beginning* of December (just after the ceasefire), there has been a notable decline in the number of air strikes and related fatalities (with the majority of the fatalities resulting from air strikes).
Fast forward another 4 months and we see that the number of battles has decreased significantly, but the number of air strikes has remained relatively stable.
How much of the Hamas military forces are destroyed?
According to Politico on May 21 only 30 to 35 percent of Hamas fighters — those who were a part of Hamas before the Oct. 7 attack — have been killed and about 65 percent of its tunnels are still intact, U.S. intelligence indicates.
More than five months earlier, it seemed bad but slightly more optimistic: According to Doron Kadosh The IDF announced Jan. 6th on the disbandment of all 12 Hamas battalions in the northern Gaza Strip - half of Hamas' military strength in Gaza.
From his description it seems that in the north it is estimated that 60% of the Hamas military strength was destroyed, and all in total 40%.
This probably means that the IDF is not planning to destroy all of Hamas' military strength, but only to weaken it significantly, or that we are expecting a very long war.
Furthermore, a Wall Street Jornal report from Jan. 21th, 2024, states that Israeli forces have killed 20% to 30% of Hamas’s fighters, U.S. intelligence agencies estimate, a toll that falls short so far of Israel’s goal of destroying the group and shows its resilience after months of war that have laid swaths of the Gaza Strip to ruin.
If that's anywhere near the truth, it means that the IDF is still far from effectively destroying all of Hamas' military strength.
Quating from the report: "Biden administration officials have begun to scale down their expectations for the war, to Hamas’s degradation as a security threat from its utter destruction.
And the U.S. has urged Israel to shift the war toward more targeted operations aimed at Hamas’s leadership.
Though Hamas has suffered thousands of casualties, according to U.S. and Israeli assessments, it aims simply to survive this conflict, current and former Israeli military officials said.
“You don’t have to win, you just have to not lose,” a senior Israeli military official said of Hamas’s goal. "
More than 7 months after the war started, while hurting Hamas tremendously, Israel failed to destroy Hamas' military strength, or Hamas' leadership.
Moreover, the Israeli government has failed to create an alternative to the Hamas regime in Gaza, which leads Hamas to be the main option, and hence survive politically.
The Hamas military personal can be replaced. So if there is no alternative to Hamas - Hamas will not be destroyed. The alternative needs support from the international community, and the Israeli government is not doing enough to create it. Putting it very gently.
Additional Fronts
In addition to the war in Gaza, Israel is being attacked from other regions.
Currently Hezbollah from Lebanon is the major front.
In addition, there are some attacks from Syria and Yemen, and even Iraq.
Israel is attacking targets in those fronts, too.
A focus on Hezbollah's use of anti-tank missles as a weapon against people and infrastructure was already presented.
We'll now explore some other fronts.
Currently Hezbollah from Lebanon is the major front.
In addition, there are some attacks from Syria and Yemen, and even Iraq.
Israel is attacking targets in those fronts, too.
A focus on Hezbollah's use of anti-tank missles as a weapon against people and infrastructure was already presented.
We'll now explore some other fronts.
to
Note you can also look at anti-tank missiles from Lebanon (against buildings and people), in the previous sections.
IDF Soldiers Killed (נופלים)
The death-toll of Oct. 7th is enormous, but with time the accumulated death-toll that followed became bigger.
to
Where did these soldiers live?
Almost everywhere.
Other than ultra-orthodox and Israeli Arabs, groups that generally do not currently contribute to Israel's military efforts - the soldiers that sacrificed their lives for the nation come from almost every town and political view.
Other than ultra-orthodox and Israeli Arabs, groups that generally do not currently contribute to Israel's military efforts - the soldiers that sacrificed their lives for the nation come from almost every town and political view.
to
Destruction in Gaza
Regarding the impact in Gaza, the primary concern for Israeli citizens remains safety and prevention of future incidents like the October 7th Massacre.
This perspective is not about seeking revenge or territorial expansion but about ensuring lasting safety.
That's my perspective, at least.
Unfortunately, some Israelis, including government ministers, have a different perspective.
It is crucial to understand the ramifications in Gaza, not as a means of comparing casualty numbers, but to grasp the full scope of the tragedy unfolding.
Is there a way to ensure safety in Israel that would have not involve so much human suffering itself?
The answer is not clear, but it is clear that the current situation is not sustainable.
But, the damage is enormous, the suffering is immense, and the goals are still not met. Many hostages were not released. Safety and prevention of future incidents like October 7th seems as far as they were on October 8th, if not more.
As an Israeli, I have a problem with the current situation. I am not sure that the current government has done the minimum required to prevent it or is doing enough to change it.
Here are a few charts that show reported damages in Gaza. Again - not for proportionality. To better understand the tragedy.
It should be noted that Hamas own reporting, as a major party in the conflict, has its own interests and perspectives, which could influence the numbers reported. And that they easily lie.
This doesn't automatically imply that the data is always and completely incorrect, but it raises questions about potential biases.
In addition, there are verification challenges. In conflict zones, especially in dense urban areas like Gaza, verifying casualty and damage figures is extremely challenging.
After many months, it seems that Hamas does lie about the number of casualties, but the order of magnitude may be still correct.
This perspective is not about seeking revenge or territorial expansion but about ensuring lasting safety.
That's my perspective, at least.
Unfortunately, some Israelis, including government ministers, have a different perspective.
It is crucial to understand the ramifications in Gaza, not as a means of comparing casualty numbers, but to grasp the full scope of the tragedy unfolding.
Is there a way to ensure safety in Israel that would have not involve so much human suffering itself?
The answer is not clear, but it is clear that the current situation is not sustainable.
But, the damage is enormous, the suffering is immense, and the goals are still not met. Many hostages were not released. Safety and prevention of future incidents like October 7th seems as far as they were on October 8th, if not more.
As an Israeli, I have a problem with the current situation. I am not sure that the current government has done the minimum required to prevent it or is doing enough to change it.
Here are a few charts that show reported damages in Gaza. Again - not for proportionality. To better understand the tragedy.
It should be noted that Hamas own reporting, as a major party in the conflict, has its own interests and perspectives, which could influence the numbers reported. And that they easily lie.
This doesn't automatically imply that the data is always and completely incorrect, but it raises questions about potential biases.
In addition, there are verification challenges. In conflict zones, especially in dense urban areas like Gaza, verifying casualty and damage figures is extremely challenging.
After many months, it seems that Hamas does lie about the number of casualties, but the order of magnitude may be still correct.
Public opinion
Exploring public opinion on the war in different countries can be quite challenging, but Google Trends offers an insightful approach.
By examining the search trends over time for "Stand with Israel" versus "From the River to the Sea" in various countries, we can begin to understand the prevailing sentiments towards the conflict.
It looks like the data is telling us a couple of things:
1. People's interest in the war is on the decline.
2. The Palestinian narrative seems to be gaining more traction than the Israeli one, even in countries that initially showed strong support for Israel.
Over time, it appears that the public opinion is increasingly leaning towards the Palestinian side of the story.
More on public opinion can be viewed through demonstrations around the world.
The following chart shows the number of demonstrations in different countries, with sentiment that is either Pro-Israel or Pro-Palestine.
This chart also tells us that people's interest in the war is on the decline, and that the Palestinian narrative is the dominant one.
In fact, the number of pro-Israel demonstrations has declined to practically zero, while the number of pro-Palestinian demonstrations has remained considerably high.
Government Failure
Our current situation in Israel consist of many government failures. Here is a partial list
1. Hostages: The government failed to rescue many hostages.
Many even argue that the government does not truly prioritize the rescue of hostages, and that their return will not happen unless the government will change.
2. Internally displaced citizens: There are about 150,000 Israelis displaced from their homes, both in the South and the North.
The government has failed to provide them with proper housing, and many are still living in hotels. The Lebanon border towns are deserted with citizens seeing no light.
The population who lived near the Gaza border is pressured to settle for conditions that are far from safetly that they deserve, and lack the quality of life and caring that we should all give them.
3. Prolonged, and failed, war:
One of Israels' consept of achieving security is short wars. Oct 7th war is not short, and with time it seems doubtful it is successful in bringing the Israel citizens the needed security.
Most of the IDF forces are no longer in Gaza, and in many ways the war is over (the fighting is not). But the war is not over for the citizens.
The government failed to provide a clear plan for the future, and the citizens are left in the dark.
This is true near Gaza, but also in the North, and in the West Bank, and Houthis attacks, and Iraq and Iran.
Many reserves soldiers are still prevented return to their lives, and are treated as government property.
4. Judicial "reform":
There is no president for the Supreme Court, delays in appointing judges in lower courts.
The courts are under a campaign of incitement, and at the same time - they appear scared and fearful, and in my view, fail in their role to protect against the misuse of power by the executive and legislative authorities.
The "reform" has reduced its profile, but the coalition parties are still working on it and pass legistlation.
5. Police:
There is no trust in the police (many cases in which policeman act as a militia that serves and is subordinate to the government, not to the law and the citizen).
6. The military is under a campaign of incitement.
7. There is division and rift among the people (is it even one people?).
8. The economy is in crisis, and at risk of a much greater crisis.
9. Media:
Media bodies that serve only the government, prominent representatives to the government (posing as journalists) in all major media outlets.
All this, alongside attacks on free media, rhetorically, economically through control mechanisms, and also through regulation.
10. International view:
Israel, amazing especially after the barbaric attack, is at a low in international support.
Israeli-U.S. relations are in crisis.
Anti-semithism has risen its head in many countries, including in the U.S. and in the U.K.
11. The state budget is sectorial, there is neither equality in burden nor in rights.
12. There is an avoidance of elections: Those that knew to demand resignation over much (much!) smaller disasters and failures, are holding to their seats, hoping the public rage will prove its bad long term memory.
13. There is evasion from establishing an investigative committee.
14. Populism, fascism (religious nationalist extremism), and religious extremism. Not a government but a regime.
15. There is a concern that the government will lead to a widespread war in the north or another sector to avoid elections and accountability.
Israel has known almost only better times, the general narrative is negative, but I have a lot of hope still.
True, not only have we been brutally attacked, but about a year later, too much still seems to go wrong - innocent people who were kidnapped from their beds are still hostages.
The war is not ending. Large parts of Israel are evacuated, and the few people who stayed are attacked daily.
International public opinion after all of this seems to be generally negative.
Israel's economy is on a decline. And, not to take lightly as this is a major issue, Israelis are internally divided.
I do believe that if we dare to be united on values (very different than just saying 'united' or 'together' while acting the other way, or while enforcing values that are not really shared by most Israelis), we can grow stronger from this.
These values are קדושת החיים (sanctity of life) and not hatred or land occupation.
These values are education, creativity, and the honest search for a harmonious life among different people, without enforcing one's beliefs as if everyone should be either the same or pushed aside.
These values should oppose terrorism and label it as such, exposing it wherever people try to portray it as something legitimate.
Just as we were educated and bred — we should strive to be a positive example, and not a mirror to many who are doing wrongs, just in the opposite direction.
None of it is simple. But it will succeed. Simply because the need for this success is stronger than any despair.
As you've noticed Yuval Harpaz (twitter.com/yuvharpaz) collected much of the data used. He also made a map showing how many of people were murdered by Hamas on Oct 7th, by their city address,
a map of rocket alarms
and much more, as you can find here and here.
a map of rocket alarms
and much more, as you can find here and here.
Other sources:
INSS data analytics desk: war-data.
Financial Times: The Israel-Hamas war in maps: latest updates, a page that has Israel ground operation map, estimation of % building destroyed or damaged and other info.
ISW Reported Israeli Ground Operations in the Gaza Strip map.
UN OCHA Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update. I perceive it as an anti-Israel coverage, and yet use some of its data.
UN OCHA Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact
Myself: hovav@hotmail.com, https://twitter.com/HovavDror
INSS data analytics desk: war-data.
Financial Times: The Israel-Hamas war in maps: latest updates, a page that has Israel ground operation map, estimation of % building destroyed or damaged and other info.
ISW Reported Israeli Ground Operations in the Gaza Strip map.
UN OCHA Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update. I perceive it as an anti-Israel coverage, and yet use some of its data.
UN OCHA Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel - reported impact
Myself: hovav@hotmail.com, https://twitter.com/HovavDror